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Abstract
Even though previous research connected personality traits and support for radical‐right populist parties (RRP), the ques‐
tion of which mechanisms connect these concepts is still underexplored. In particular, we focus on narcissistic rivalry, a
maladaptive path of grandiose narcissism. Drawing on the affective intelligence framework and the narcissistic admira‐
tion and rivalry concept, we propose that the effect of rival narcissism on vote choice for the German Alternative für
Deutschland is mediated by reactionary political orientations and activated by anger. Drawing on 2017 data from the
mixed‐mode representative GESIS panel (N = 2,552 & 1,901), we employ moderated mediation analyses. We show that
reactionary political orientations mediate the relationship between narcissistic rivalry and RRP support. However, high lev‐
els of generalised anger are needed to activate the relationship between personality, reactionary values, and RRP support,
whereas the mediating role of anti‐immigrant sentiment is not affected by anger. Our study emphasises the role of anger
in RRP support, thus showing that anger might explain why only some people with a specific predisposition support RRPs.
The study also stresses the complexity of the relationship between personality, value orientations, and political behaviour.
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1. Introduction
The success of radical‐right populist parties (RRP) across
many Western democracies has created considerable
interest among political scientists about the factors that
have driven this support (e.g., Arzheimer & Berning,
2019; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Rydgren, 2008). Initially, most
studies focused on short‐term explanations for this sup‐
port, such as economic, cultural, or status‐threat percep‐
tions, or preferences for specific policies (e.g., Rydgren,
2008). More recently, a growing number of researchers
have been studying the psychological characteristics and
basic values that underpin RRP support. This strand
of research has highlighted the importance of funda‐
mental traits, such as the Big Five personality traits or
grandiose narcissism, and has shown that a consider‐
able proportion of the population is, at least in principle,
receptive to the appeal of RRPs (e.g., Ackermann et al.,
2018; Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker et al., 2016;
Mayer et al., 2020). The focus on the psychological under‐
pinnings of radical‐right support, however, also raises
a more fundamental question: Through which mecha‐
nisms are basic personality factors translated into polit‐
ical attitudes, and ultimately into behaviour? To address
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this question, we focus on three concepts that have been
central to the public discussion of RRP support, but that
have not yet been connected in the literature: narcissism,
anger, and reactionary political orientation (RPO).
Previous studies found that the effect of personal‐
ity traits on vote choice was mostly mediated by a set
of more general attitudes or beliefs (e.g., Aichholzer &
Zandonella, 2016; Schimpf & Schoen, 2017; Schoen &
Schumann, 2007). We follow this mediation logic and
draw on Capelos and Katsanidou’s (2018) concept of RPO
to argue that focusing on such orientations helps clarify
the mechanisms that connect psychological dynamics to
political behaviour. By seeking to overturn the present
social and political status quo for an (often naively)
imagined idealised past, reactionary orientations form a
co‐occurring bundle of low political efficacy, a rejection
of outsiders through xenophobia and anti‐European sen‐
timent, and low levels of political trust that closelymatch
the discourse instrumentalised by populist parties and
politicians (see also Nijs et al., 2020). We will argue that
RPOs play an importantmediating role in connecting per‐
sonality traits to RRP support.
Existing studies have focused primarily on the Big
Five personality traits as measures of personality, but
they do not include other more fitting personality con‐
ceptions. Furthermore, the study of stable personal‐
ity traits and RRP support limits our ability to account
for short‐term changes and the “political activation”
of these traits. Using narcissism and placing RPOs at
the centre of our theoretical model, however, helps us
address both of these shortcomings. Using high‐quality
panel data from a mixed‐mode access panel represen‐
tative of the German population (GESIS panel), we ana‐
lyse support for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)
to argue that grandiose narcissism, particularly in its
maladaptive form of narcissistic rivalry, is an important
driver of RRP support, because it shares a close affinity
with RPOs. Similarly, focusing on narcissism and RPOs
also allows us to elaborate on the close relationship
between anger and RRP support (Banks, 2016; Marcus
et al., 2019; Rico et al., 2017). By integrating insights
from personality psychology and the affective intelli‐
gence framework (Marcus, 2000), we demonstrate how
important negative emotionality, especially anger, is for
“activating” the RPOs of narcissistic individuals, and thus
their support for RRPs.
2. The Psychological Roots of RRP Support: Narcissism,
Anger, and RPO
On the individual level, existing explanations for RRP
support have traditionally focused on socioeconomic
factors and a subsequent backlash against cosmopoli‐
tan elites and immigration. Conceptualised as “losers
of globalisation,” RRP voters are less‐educated, work‐
ing class males with a greater risk of unemployment
(Lengfeld, 2017; Oesch & Rennwald, 2018) and are there‐
fore more likely to be both economically and culturally
threatened by increasingly open and less‐traditional soci‐
eties (for a discussion of the underpinnings of threat,
see also the contribution by Ferrari, 2021, in this issue).
But while debates are ongoing about whether RRP sup‐
port is primarily driven by economic insecurity or driven
simply by a cultural backlash against the perceived loss
of privilege, the empirical support for the link between
socioeconomic disadvantage and right‐wing populism
remains mixed at best (Knigge, 1998; Lengfeld, 2017;
Rooduijn, 2017).
More recently, scholars have also begun to investi‐
gate how voters’ underlying attitudes and values relate
to their support for RRPs. Voters may be drawn to RRPs
because they share their populist conception of democ‐
racy, or because they are psychologically predisposed
towards supporting RRPs. This literature has identified a
core set of populist attitudes, which is orthogonal to the
traditional left–right party spectrum, and which focuses
on the rejection of (political) elites and a homogenous
conception of the body politic (Akkerman et al., 2014;
Hawkins et al., 2018; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018).
However, voters may also be attracted by RRPs
because of the parties’ host ideology. We argue that
there is a significant overlap between RPOs and RRP sup‐
port. Specifically, the nativist and reactionary nostalgia
at the core of RRPs host ideology (Betz & Johnson, 2004;
Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2018) closely mirrors the
reactionary nostalgia of voterswith strong RPOs (Capelos
& Katsanidou, 2018). As Capelos and Katsanidou (2018)
emphasise, RPOs form voters’ core political orienta‐
tion, particularly their nostalgia for an idealised and
homogenised past. In this, they are more than the sum
of their individual parts; they are “complex clusters of
resentful affective experiences” (Capelos & Katsanidou,
2018, p. 1284) that combine a desire to return to an
idealised past with a resentful reaction towards the
present. In addition, the contents of this conglomerate
of backward‐gazing values to an idealised past and a
resentful affectivity towards what is new is also affected
by the supply side of politics and a country‐specific con‐
text (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018). For further discus‐
sion of the concept, see Salmela and Capelos (2021)
in this issue. Thus, references to a strong state and a
strong leader might not, in all countries, be connected
to a wish to return to the past, but in others―such as
Germany—they are closely linked with the Third Reich
(e.g., Arzheimer & Berning, 2019).
Following this theoretical insight, we argue that tak‐
ing RPOs seriously can go a long way towards clarifying
the mechanisms that connect voters’ basic psychological
makeup with their support for RRPs.
2.1. RRP Support and Personality Structures:
The Importance of Narcissism
In recent years, a growing body of research has identi‐
fied a close relationship between basic personality traits
and support for RRPs. In this approach, support for RRPs
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is not simply an expression of temporary social or eco‐
nomic concerns, but rather a reflection of a more funda‐
mental psychological disposition. A particular focus has
been placed on the Big Five personality traits. Specifically,
low levels of agreeableness and openness to experience,
and sometimes a high level of conscientiousness and
neuroticism, were found to be related to right‐wing vote
choice (Aichholzer & Zandonella, 2016; Bakker et al.,
2020; Schimpf & Schoen, 2017). Moreover, ideological
attitudes such as social‐dominance orientation and right‐
wing authoritarianism have also exhibited strong associ‐
ations with RRP support (Berning & Ziller, 2017).
Placing voters’ RPOs at the centre of our analysis,
however, also sharpens our focus towards other less fre‐
quently studied personality traits such as the concept
of grandiose narcissism (Raskin & Hall, 1979). Grandiose
narcissism usually describes a pattern of grandiosity, a
need for admiration, and a lack of empathy for others
(e.g., Campbell & Miller, 2013). We focus on individual
narcissism as a personality trait. Other studies, such as
the one by de Zavala et al.(2009), rely on the concept
of “collective narcissism,” an emotionalised sub‐facet
of national identification alongside hostile reactions
to in‐group image threats which is not part of our
study. Grandiose narcissism has been linked to a vari‐
ety of negative outcomes related to psychological health
(e.g., Campbell et al., 2002), but also to political ideol‐
ogy and prejudice (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2017). Regarding
its relationship with the Big Five traits, narcissism is
generally found to be closely related to agreeableness
(negatively for rivalry) and extraversion (positively for
admiration; e.g., Back et al., 2013). What makes the con‐
cept of narcissism so central to the study of RPOs, how‐
ever, are the affective, cognitive, and behavioural dynam‐
ics that narcissists employ to maintain their grandiose
self, particularly when their narcissism takes the mal‐
adaptive path of narcissistic rivalry. Specifically, Back
et al. (2013) introduce two distinct domains of narcis‐
sism that have been validated by different studies (e.g.,
Leckelt et al., 2018; Rogoza, Żemojtel‐Piotrowska, et
al., 2016): narcissistic admiration and narcissistic rivalry.
While narcissistic admiration refers to an adaptive path‐
way that uses assertive self‐promotion and charming‐
ness to strive for uniqueness, the maladaptive path of
narcissistic rivalry protects the grandiose self through
aggressiveness by striving for supremacy and by deval‐
uating others.
It is this maladaptive path that is particularly salient
for the study of RPOs and RRP support. To dismiss per‐
ceived threats to the ego, those with high levels of nar‐
cissistic rivalry will focus on controlling others and their
environment tomaintain the grandiose self (e.g., Rogoza,
Żemojtel‐Piotrowska, et al., 2016). Individuals with high
narcissistic rivalry will thus respond to both real and
imagined status threats with an aggressive devaluation
of others, particularly of other social outgroups (e.g.,
Back et al., 2013). This in turn increases the appeal of
RRPs. Indeed, a recent study by Mayer et al. (2020) finds
a strong relationship between narcissistic rivalry and sup‐
port for RRPs. Moreover, this relationship is mediated
especially through anti‐immigrant sentiment (AIS). With
regard to values, previous studies have found a negative
relationship between the high‐order value conservation
and narcissism but have failed to include items for the
narcissistic rivalry dimension (e.g., Rogoza & Cieciuch,
2020; Rogoza, Żemojtel‐Piotrowska, et al., 2016). In con‐
trast, Mayer et al. (2020) show a strong link between nar‐
cissistic rivalry and right‐wing authoritarianism, a basic
attitudinal belief system that strongly supports traditions
and stability (Altemeyer, 1998).
We argue that the maladaptive responses associated
with narcissistic rivalry should also be associated with
an increase in more conservative and reactionary val‐
ues. As discussed, rival narcissists protect their grandiose
self through an aggressive elevation of their own iden‐
tity vis‐à‐vis others, and through an attempt to assert
supremacy over them. The rejection of immigrants is one
such path. However, we argue that rival narcissists will
also be drawn to the reactionary nostalgia at the core
of RPOs, since the “nostalgic accounts of pride and feel‐
ing of strength” (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018, p. 1276)
are inexorably linked to a sense of “national greatness
and economic supremacy” (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018,
p. 1284). The “idealised past” conjured up through RPOs
is one of strong traditions, stability, and a strong state, all
of which serve to protect the unquestioned supremacy
of the in‐group, and by extension, the rival narcissists.
To summarise, we hypothesise that high levels of nar‐
cissistic rivalry increase support for RRPs (Hypothesis 1).
However, we expect that this effect will be mediated by
RPOs (Hypothesis 2). Specifically, individuals with high
levels of narcissistic rivalrywill have higher levels of RPOs.
Higher levels of RPOs thus increase support for RRPs.
2.2. Anger and the Importance of Emotions
Taking RPOs seriously also highlights an arguably more
transient, but no less important, factor driving RRP
support: voters’ emotions. Scholars have increasingly
recognised the importance that emotions play in under‐
standing political behaviour in general (Marcus, 2000);
negative emotions are central to explaining support for
RRPs (Banks, 2016; Marcus et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos &
Lachat, 2018). Anger and resentment appear to be espe‐
cially important for RRP attitudes and support (e.g., Rico
et al., 2017). Indeed, the notion of the Wutbürger or
the “angrywhitemen” (Ford&Goodwin, 2010)—citizens
whose (excessive) anger drives them to reject “politics as
usual”—has become a common trope for the description
of reactionary politics and RRP voters.
Why is anger so inexorably linked with RRP support?
Of course, anger may simply be part of the “political
style” of populist parties (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) and
the “resentful affectivity” (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018,
p. 1274) associated with RPOs. (For another study on the
concept of resentful affectivity, see the contribution by
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Celis et al., 2021, on this issue.) However, voters’ emo‐
tions are not only a direct explanatory factor for RRP sup‐
port, they also clarify the mechanisms that connect per‐
sonality traits such as narcissistic rivalry, RPOs, and RRP
support. Specifically, we make two related arguments.
First, we follow insights from the affective intelligence lit‐
erature (Marcus et al., 2019) to argue that the relation‐
ship between anger and RRP support is deeper, driven
by the cognitive mechanisms associated with high levels
of anger. Second, we emphasise the close link between
anger and narcissism in general, and narcissistic rivalry in
particular. Narcissistic individuals do not only experience
anger more frequently, they also channel and express
this anger differently.
The close relationship between anger and RRPs
reflects a more general overlap between the cognitive
effects of anger and the affective and attitudinal ori‐
entations of reactionary political values and RRP sup‐
port. Affective intelligence theory has shown that anger
is associated with habitual cognition and a reliance on
established patterns of thought and behaviour. Because
anger is focused on dealing with threats (Vasilopoulos
et al., 2019) and rendering social judgement for viola‐
tions of social norms (Petersen, 2010), angry individu‐
als are more likely to assign blame and responsibility
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Anger
thus links closely to several key components of the reac‐
tionary core of RRPs.Most fundamentally, anger not only
increases the perceived responsibility of existing polit‐
ical elites but it also motivates voters to punish them
(Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Milburn et al., 2014), creating
a close affinity with the rejection of the political status
quo that is core to RRPs. Moreover, anger is also linked
to reactionary attitudes such as nativism and authori‐
tarianism commonly associated with RRPs (Dunn, 2015;
Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Finally, the reduced
depth of processing associated with anger also increases
reliance on ethnocentrism and perceptions of group‐
threat in particular (Banks, 2016).
Moreover, the cognitive dynamics associated with
anger form the “connective tissue” that connects nar‐
cissism to RPOs, and ultimately to political behaviour
such as RRP support. This connection happens in two
distinct but related ways. First, personality traits struc‐
ture emotional responses and thus also the frequency
and strength of those responses. Anger, for example,
seems to be at the emotional heart of narcissism, and
the link between narcissism and anger has been a core
component of our understanding of narcissism, both in
their early psychoanalytic origins and in more contem‐
porary studies in social psychology (Czarna et al., 2018;
Sauls & Zeigler‐Hill, 2020). Narcissists experience anger
at a consistently higher rate than non‐narcissists (Czarna
et al., 2018), and rival narcissists especially appear to
have a more difficult time regulating negative emotions
(Cheshure et al., 2020) such as anger (Krizan & Johar,
2015). At least some narcissists may therefore have
higher levels of trait anger, which in turn renders them
more susceptible to the appeal of RPOs and more likely
to support RRPs.
More importantly, however, narcissism also impacts
the ways in which anger is triggered, channelled, and
expressed. As outlined above, rival narcissists more fre‐
quently channel their anger in an aggressive assertion
of dominance and superiority to counteract ego threats
(Czarna et al., 2018). In other words, narcissists may not
only experience anger more frequently, but they also act
differently when they get angry. The habitual pattern
triggered for a person with a high level of rival narcissism
is more likely to evolve around social dominance and
hierarchy and the devaluation of others, thus creating a
much closer affinity to RPOs and RRPs. We thus hypoth‐
esise that anger activates the relationships between
(rival) narcissism, RPOs, and RRP support (Hypothesis 3),
either because anger leads to rival narcissists having
higher levels of RPOs, or because anger makes RPOs
more salient for the support of RRPs (Hypotheses 3a
and 3b respectively).
Figure 1 summarises our argument and our hypothe‐
ses. We contend that RPOs are an important factor in
the study of RRP support, not only because RPOs directly
explain subsequent vote choice, but also because they
are an important path on which personality traits, partic‐
ularly narcissistic rivalry, can be made politically salient
and actionable. Moreover, we highlight the important
role that anger plays in connecting these relationships.
While anger in general shares some overlap with RPOs,
it is especially important for the activation of rival nar‐
cissism, both by increasing the appeal of RPOs and in
the ways in which these orientations influence the sub‐
sequent appeal of RRPs.
3. Data and Methods
Our study draws on several waves of the GESIS panel
(Bosnjak et al., 2017; GESIS, 2017), a bi‐monthly mixed‐
mode access panel representative of theGerman popula‐
tion, with a response rate of over 90%. The initial recruit‐
ment of the respondents was carried out in February
2014 and replacement waves were conducted in 2016
and 2018. The datawe usedwasmostly collected in 2017
(waves E*) and 2018 (waves GA). Panellists who have
missing values for any of the variables we are interested
in are excluded from the analyses, hence our analyses are
based on N = 2,525 individuals for the regression analy‐
sis and N = 1,901 for the mediation analysis. We pooled
several waves for our measures (see Supplementary File,
Table A1, for the descriptive statistics, the wording of
questions, and specific wave references for all variables).
Our main dependent variable is RRP support, cap‐
tured here through electoral support for the right‐
wing populist AfD. Specifically, respondents were asked
directly after the general election of 2017 forwhich party
they had voted with their second vote. We coded all
respondents who named the AfD with 1 and coded 0
for respondents who took part in the election but who















Figure 1. Theoretical model of the relationship between narcissistic rivalry, anger, RPOs and RRP support.
voted differently with their second vote. Our analyses
thus exclude all non‐voters (10% of all cases; N = 394).
The result was that 9.9% of the respondents indicated
that they had voted for the AfD. This is lower than the
official second vote count of 12.6%, a phenomenon well‐
known in research (e.g., Mayer et al., 2020).
To measure narcissism, we used a validated
short scale of the Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry
Questionnaire (NARQ, Back et al., 2013), which mea‐
sures each dimension with three items such as “I earned
being viewed as a great personality” (for narcissistic
admiration), and “I want my opponents to fail” and
“Most people are losers” (for narcissistic rivalry; e.g.,
Paulhus et al., 2004). The answer options ranged from 1
(does not apply at all) to 6 (fully applies).
We operationalised RPOs based on two different but
related concepts: reactionary value orientation (focused
on the past) and AIS (as an affective measure of resent‐
ment towards newcomers). To capture reactionary value
orientations, respondents were asked to what extent
they are similar to (a) citizens who seek to preserve tradi‐
tional values and beliefs (value facet tradition, Schwartz
et al., 2012), and (b) citizens who prefer a strong state
(value facet security/societal, Schwartz et al., 2012).
The options ranged from 1 (not at all similar) to 6 (very
similar). Both values are part of the higher order value
“Conservation” (Schwartz et al., 2012). For the measure‐
ment of affective resentment towards newcomers, we
used four items to measure AIS that asked for feelings
towards Muslims, foreigners, refugees, and Sinti and
Roma in Germany (1 for very positive to 5 for very neg‐
ative; 𝛼 = 0.83). To measure generalised negative emo‐
tions―fear and anger specifically—respondents were
asked how frequently they had felt afraid or annoyed in
the last four weeks (0 for not at all to 10 very often). It is
important to note that this measurement may capture
both a temporary increase in these emotions or a more
general disposition towards them. However, both trait
and state anger shape judgements and cognition in simi‐
lar ways, and higher levels of state anger are also linked
to greater incidence of state anger (Deffenbacher et al.,
1996). So, while these measures cannot disentangle gen‐
eralised trait and state emotions, the overarching rela‐
tionship to narcissism, RPOs, and RRP support should still
fall in line with our theoretical priors.
To maintain comparability with standard models of
RRP vote choice, all models control for standard socio‐
demographic factors such as gender, educational level,
East or West German origin, age, as well as labour mar‐
ket status through a dummy variable for regular employ‐
ment (full time or part time; e.g., Arzheimer & Berning,
2019) and left–right self‐placement. In addition, all logis‐
tic regression models include political attitudes that
in previous studies were found to have a substantial
effect on RRP vote choice: internal and external efficacy
(recoded so that higher values indicate higher efficacy),
satisfaction with democracy, and satisfaction with their
financial situation.
For the initial results, we estimated logistic regres‐
sion models with robust standard errors for vote choice.
For these estimates, we used mean indices for narcis‐
sism, reactionary political values, and AIS. To test the
model outlined in Figure 1 directly, we then used struc‐
tural equation modelling (SEM) to estimate a moderated
mediation model which can simultaneously estimate all
the paths outlined in Figure 1. This model aims to esti‐
mate both the direct and indirect effect of narcissis‐
tic rivalry through increases in reactionary political val‐
ues on RRP vote choice. Moreover, we conducted the
analysis for angry and non‐angry individuals simultane‐
ously (anger was defined as individuals being above or
below the median anger score in the sample) to esti‐
mate the moderating effect that anger may have on
both the direct and indirect paths. For these analyses,
we included narcissism, reactionary political values, and
AIS as latent variables. All mediated moderation models
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 248–259 252
were estimated through SEMs using lavaan (Rosseel,
2012) with diagonally weighted least square (DWLS)
estimation. We recoded all independent variables to a
range from 0 to 1 so that all analyses could compare
non‐standardised estimates between models.
We are aware of the many restrictions of using
moderated mediation analysis with cross‐sectional data
instead of panel data, as cross‐sectional data analyses,
for example, sometimes cannot reveal the real longi‐
tudinal mediation process (for an overview, see e.g.,
O’Laughlin et al., 2018; Rohrer et al., 2021). However, we
were not able to use panel data for the variables of inter‐
est as they were not measured regularly enough. In such
cases, especially in studies between personality traits
and vote choice, relying on cross‐sectional data is an
established approach with the clear need to carefully dis‐
cuss one’s assumptions and to proceedwith caution (e.g.,
Wang, 2016). It is thus necessary to rule out possible con‐
founders of the independent, mediator, and dependent
variable, as well as to discuss the possibility of reverse
causality (Rohrer et al., 2021). In addition, our treat‐
ment should be independent from the mediator (Imai
et al., 2011). We controlled for several variables that
might have affected our three variables of interest—as
discussed in the previous paragraph—to account for the
first assumption. Next, reverse causality does not seem
to be plausible for the path from narcissistic rivalry to
RPO, as personality traits are supposed to be very stable
(e.g., Back et al., 2013; Wang, 2016). We also assumed
that the two facets of RPO—reactionary values and AIS—
are longstanding belief systems that are causally placed
at the same level, but we agree that this could be debat‐
able. For the path between RPO and vote choice, we
assumed, based on previous studies, that vote choice is
less stable than values, and thus that a path from RPO to
vote choice—and not the other way around—is plausible
(Caprara et al., 2006).
To facilitate transparency and replicability, all data
cleaning and analysis code has been uploaded to the
OSF.io repository (Mayer & Nguyen, 2021).
4. Results
4.1. RPOs Mediate the Effect of Narcissism and Negative
Emotions on RRP Support
We have hypothesised that narcissistic rivalry increases
RRP support, but that this support may be medi‐
ated through reactionary political values. To test these
hypotheses empirically, we begin with a stepwise regres‐
sion analysis that shows how our core variables of
interest behave in relation to vote choice for the AfD
(see Table 1), and how this relationship changes when
additional variables are included. As expected, we find
stronger evidence for Hypothesis 2 than for Hypothesis 1.
While we initially find a direct relationship between
narcissistic rivalry and RRP support in models M0 and
M1, this relationship becomes non‐significant once we
include controls for RPOs. This does not change in
model M3, where we include additional controls that
have been found to explain RRP support. The effect of
anger appears to be similarly mediated. Although anger
remains significant in model M2, including the full set
of controls similarly renders it non‐significant. In short,
the results in Table 1 give a strong indication that the
effects of narcissism aremediated by RPOs, and that neg‐
ative emotions such as anger and resentment play a simi‐
larly contingent role in driving RRP support.When includ‐
ing the Big Five personality traits (based on the BFI‐10),
rivalry is only significant in model M0 at the 10% level.
However, none of the Big Five traits has a significant rela‐
tionship in model M3. Furthermore, RPOs are important
drivers of RRP support in model M3, especially AIS.
4.2. Anger Makes Narcissism and RPOs Politically Salient
While the results in Table 1 show some support for
Hypothesis 2, untangling the relationship shown in
Figure 1 between narcissistic rivalry, anger, RPOs, and
RRP support requires a modelling approach that allows
us to capture both the mediating role of RPOs and the
moderating role of anger, while also controlling for the
full set of independent variables outlined in Table 1.
We therefore employed a mediated moderation SEM to
simultaneously estimate all paths shown in Figure 1 and
estimated the extent to which narcissistic rivalry is linked
to RRP support either directly (Hypothesis 1) or indirectly
through RPOs (Hypothesis 2), and to what extent these
relationshipsmay bemoderated by respondents’ level of
anger (Hypothesis 3).
Table 2 summarises the results of our mainmediated
moderation analysis (for the full model see SI, Table A3)
and strongly supports Hypothesis 2. Reactionary politi‐
cal values fully mediate the effect of narcissistic rivalry
on RRP support. Indeed, as in Table 1, we find no sig‐
nificant direct effect once potential mediating relation‐
ships are considered. Moreover, we also find support
for Hypothesis 3. Anger is a necessary condition of
the relationship between narcissism and RRP support.
The total effect of narcissistic rivalry is non‐significant
in the low anger condition but becomes significant in
the high anger condition. However, this relationship is
mediated through RPOs. The direct effect of narcissistic
rivalry on RRP support is not statistically significant in
either condition.
Moreover, these relationships appear to be robust
with the inclusion of other personality variables, such as
the Big Five personality traits or measures of narcissistic
admiration and generalised anxiety (see Supplementary
File, Tables A4 and A5). The same is true for the inclusion
of financial satisfaction (Supplementary File, Table A6).
However, the SEM model also lets us disentangle
these relationships further. Table 3 disaggregates the
mediated relationships into the two subcomponents of
RPOs we have identified: reactionary political values and
AIS. Doing so demonstrates that, while the relationship
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Table 1. Stepwise logistic regression models on RRP support, average marginal effects.
M0 Narcissism baseline M1 + Emotions M2 + RPOs M3 Full model
Narcissistic admiration −0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Narcissistic rivalry 0.14** 0.13** 0.00 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Emotion: Fear −0.06 −0.04 −0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Emotion: Anger 0.10*** 0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Reactionary Orientations
Reactionary political values 0.19*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.03)
AIS index 0.53*** 0.27***
(0.04) (0.04)
Common explanatory variables
for RRP vote choice
Internal political efficacy 0.04
(0.02)








Occupational status: Full/part time 0.00
(0.01)
Socio‐demographic controls
Age in years −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education (ref. cat: middle)
Low 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High −0.07*** −0.06*** −0.02* −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Origin: East Germany 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gender: Male 0.04** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N 2,552 2,552 2,552 2,552
Nagelkerke’s Pseudo‐R2 0.06 0.07 0.27 0.42
AIC 1402 1392 1099 890
BIC 1449 1451 1169 995
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; sample weight (pw = z000011a) and cluster robust SE used; all independent variables recoded
to the range of 0–1; *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
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Table 2. Summary of mediated moderation models: General overview.
Effects on RRP support
Anger Direct Total indirect via RPOs Total
Narcissistic rivalry Low −0.477 1.359 *** 0.883
(p = 0.598) (p = 0.001) (p = 0.312)
High 0.226 1.665 *** 1.892 *
(p = 0.774) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.016)
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05; N = 1,901, 𝜒2 = 652.188, DF = 90, RMSEA = 0.0542, CFI = 0.907; all coefficients are standardised
estimates.
Table 3.Mediated moderation models: Detailed overview.
Effect on RRP support mediated by… Anger Effect size Std. Error p‐value
AIS Low 1.533 0.263 < 0.001
High 1.035 0.334 < 0.001
Reactionary political values Low −0.174 0.171 0.310
High 0.630 0.238 0.008
Notes: N = 1,901; 𝜒2 = 652.188, DF = 90, RMSEA = 0.0542, CFI = 0.907; all coefficients are standardised estimates.
between narcissism, AIS and RRP support can be found in
both low and high anger conditions, reactionary political
values are only linked to RPOs in high anger conditions.
To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b specifically, Figure 2 dis‐
aggregates this relationship further. Specifically, Figure 2
shows how narcissistic rivalry is linked to reactionary
values and to AIS, and how these are in turn related
to RRP support for both the low and high anger con‐
ditions. Disaggregating the paths further helps to sug‐
gest a particular mechanism in play. Most paths are con‐
sistent in both the low and the high anger conditions;
only the path between narcissistic rivalry and reactionary
political values is statistically different between the low
and high anger conditions (p = 0.001). In other words,
some aspects of RPOs are independent of respondent
anger. Rival narcissism always correlates with higher AIS,
which in turn is associated with a higher probability to
vote for the AfD. However, anger seems to play a cen‐
tral role in “activating” the value dimension of RPOs, and
thus RRP support. While voters with reactionary politi‐
cal values always show higher support for RRPs, narcis‐
sistic rivalry only becomes associated with reactionary
political values when respondents are also at higher lev‐
els of anger. In other words, the results suggest that it
is anger that makes narcissistic rivalry politically salient.
In summary, our results clearly support our theoretical
priors: 1) that RPO mediates the relationship between
narcissistic rivalry and RRP support, and 2) that anger,
even when it is generalised, is a crucial component of
these relationships.
5. Concluding Remarks and Perspectives
Understanding the mechanisms behind RRP support
allows society to take a better stance against the rise of
such parties that often deeply divide society. Previous
research on the psychological roots of RRP support
















Figure 2.Mediation between narcissistic rivalry and RRP support for low and high anger conditions (only significant paths
are displayed).
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and emotions such as anger, to be strongly connected.
In addition, a more general, backward‐looking, reac‐
tionary political perspective also fosters RRP. However,
existing studies have not considered the dynamic inter‐
play between these different factors, thus leaving the
mechanisms understudied. This article has attempted to
address that gap.
We find that RPOs, such as value orientations for sup‐
porting a strong state and traditional ways, as well as
AIS, play an important role in driving RRP support, even
when controlling for other factors known from the lit‐
erature. Moreover, focusing on RPOs also clarifies the
relationships that connect personality structure, emo‐
tions, and RRP support. The effect of narcissistic rivalry
on RRP support, for example, is mediated through both
AIS (replicating the findings of Mayer et al., 2020) and a
value orientation that focuses on traditional values and a
strong state. However, this second relationship needs to
be “activated” by negative emotions: Narcissism is only
associated with more reactionary political values when
respondents are angry.
Our article thus makes an important contribution to
several different studies. Most directly, our article adds
to the study of RRP support, highlighting once more
that psychological factors such as personality structure
and emotions are crucial components of RRP support,
although their effect is entirely mediated through inter‐
mediate political orientations. However, our article also
explores the mechanisms that connect “basic” psycho‐
logical factors to political behaviour more closely. When
focusing on the role that emotions play, we find that gen‐
eralised anger is an important component for the asso‐
ciation between narcissistic rivalry and RPOs, and ulti‐
mately for RRP support. As anger can also be triggered by
current and past events, it can thus be one of the miss‐
ing pieces of the puzzle of why some people with a spe‐
cific predisposition support an RRP. This shows the impor‐
tance of interdisciplinary research between psychology
and political science.
Our study is not without limitations. Our results
are based on the German case and only focus on one
year (2017). It is thus to be seen whether the results
are time—and place—invariant. However, the AfD is
now considered a rather typical case of an RRP (e.g.,
Arzheimer & Berning, 2019), and the immigrant influx
of 2015 was already two years past when the data of
our study were obtained, thus making it more likely that
our results are not unique to Germany. In addition, we
are not able to observe how anger, narcissism, and RPOs
interact in a longitudinal or experimental context. Future
research thus needs to expand on our dynamic perspec‐
tive and empirically test not only how stable these pat‐
terns are, but also whether these mechanisms are actu‐
ally causal, as our results are based on cross‐sectional
data. Nevertheless, our results clearly suggest how com‐
plex the relationship can be between personality, value
orientations and political behaviour.
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